---
title: "Their Job Put Them on the Keys in Hurricane Season. Somebody Else Had to Order the Train."
canonical: "https://anchor.is/docket/issue/58/archive/article/65668/their-job-put-them-on-the-keys-in"
publication: "The Docket"
publisher: "The Docket"
language: "en-US"
guide: "https://anchor.is/docket/llms.txt"
format: "The Rescue Train"
author: "Seth D. Carrington"
author_url: "https://anchor.is/docket/team/30"
issue: 58
section: "archive"
section_name: "Climate Past"
published: 2026-11-13
updated: 2026-11-14
description: "Florida Keys, 1935: veterans' lives depended on a train their employer had to order; afterward, Congress compensated their families as relief workers, not soldiers."
word_count: 3351
source_links: 12
---

# Their Job Put Them on the Keys in Hurricane Season. Somebody Else Had to Order the Train.

*By [Seth D. Carrington](<https://anchor.is/docket/team/30/markdown>)*

*November 13, 2026*

[Read on the website](<https://anchor.is/docket/issue/58/archive/article/65668/their-job-put-them-on-the-keys-in>)

*On Labor Day weekend in 1935, about 400 First World War veterans waited in government work camps on the Florida Keys while the men who could summon an evacuation train talked on the telephone. Then came the hearings, and then the paperwork.*

Late on the afternoon of Labor Day 1935, at Homestead, Florida, a railroad crew stopped their train and spent about fifteen minutes turning the locomotive around. It was sound practice. The train was headed down the Florida Keys to collect several hundred men, and the crew wanted the engine running backward on the way down so it could pull them home facing forward. Anybody who has had to back a loaded trailer a long way will follow the reasoning.

They picked up some telegraph linemen while they were at it and pushed on south, toward what turned out to be one of the most intense hurricanes ever to hit the United States.

Nobody on that crew was loafing. The fifteen minutes matter only because, by the time the train reached Homestead, most of the time anyone had for this rescue was already gone. It had been spent over the previous day and a half, mostly on the telephone, while officials waited to see where the storm would go.

The men the train was coming for had no part in those calls. They were in camps on the Matecumbe Keys, a few low islands about eighty miles south of Miami, because that was where their job was. The job came with an understanding about how they would leave.

## Thirty dollars and no fare home

They had served in the First World War, and by 1935 the Depression had cleaned most of them out. People sometimes remember the camps as the place the government stashed the Bonus Army, the veterans who marched on Washington in 1932 to demand early payment of a promised bonus. Some of these men may well have marched; the records don't say how many. What the records do show is a program built for broke veterans turning up in Washington, and at least some of these men came south straight out of the city's shelters for homeless men.

The White House had told the federal relief officials, the people running the Depression's jobs programs and handouts, to take care of the veterans turning up in the capital. Aubrey Williams, one of the senior men responsible, later explained to Congress why the answer was work camps in Florida. In warm weather you don't have to heat the buildings, and you can build them lighter. There was useful work down there. And other states didn't want unemployed men from somewhere else, which says something about how a broke American was received once he crossed a state line.

Hurricanes, which come with the warm weather, did not make Williams's list.

The pay was about thirty dollars a month plus room and board, for building bridges on a highway meant to run down the Keys. The room was a wooden building sitting on blocks, its walls spiked down, the anchoring that was supposed to hold it in place still unfinished. Two of the three camps stood on the ocean side of the islands. S. C. Cutler, the camps' works director, told Congress plainly: "it was never intended to house the men in those buildings during a hurricane."

That was an honest description of a cheap barracks. It also meant the safety of every man in those camps came down to the plan for getting them off the islands.

That plan did not include them walking out on their own. Julius Stone, the Florida relief official who set up the arrangement, told Congress what a man heard if he wanted to leave:

> "Fine, but if you go you are through. You cannot come back."

There was no fare home. A survivor named Harold Langlois testified that staying on at the Washington shelter hadn't been offered either. It was the camp or nothing.

So a man was free to leave the way anybody is free to quit his only job in a strange town with no bus money. Payday came Friday, August 30, the start of the holiday weekend, and [roughly 300 men](https://dpanther.fiu.edu/record/601029/files/B01_Tempting_the_Fates_Tequesta_v1_2005.pdf) took their pay and went off for the holiday. About 400 stayed. If a storm came, those 400 were counting on a train.

## The railroad's questions

Back in the spring, Fred Ghent, who ran the veterans' work program in Florida, had written the Florida East Coast Railway to ask what it could do for him in a hurricane. The railroad answered on June 6. It [offered equipment](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/SERIALSET-09994_00_00-122-2899-0001/pdf/SERIALSET-09994_00_00-122-2899-0001.pdf) for two trains on twelve hours' notice.

Then it asked some questions. Where would the men go? Who would arrange the crews and equipment? Had anybody talked to the town at the other end about sanitation? Unload several hundred men somewhere and they will need to eat, sleep and find a toilet before the railroad has finished its paperwork. The letter reads like it came from people who had moved crowds of human beings before and knew what it took.

No finished plan answering it has ever turned up, nothing with a destination, a trigger for calling the train, and a name attached to the order. Ray Sheldon, the superintendent in charge of the camps, told Congress he'd never seen the letter. "Well, now, it may seem strange," he said, "but I had no knowledge of it."

What Sheldon did have, by Sunday afternoon of the holiday weekend, was fresh word from a railroad official that a train could be made up and brought down within three or four hours of an order.

Twelve hours in June, three or four on Sunday, and by his own account Sheldon only ever heard the second number. Put yourself in his shoes, deciding whether to haul four hundred men off an island on a holiday weekend for a storm that might miss by fifty miles. You'd have believed it too.

## Sunday on the telephone

On Sunday morning, September 1, the Weather Bureau, forerunner of today's National Weather Service, was tracking a small storm in the Bahamas moving west. It expected the storm to pass through the Florida Straits, the water between the Keys and Cuba. One version of that morning's advisory put the hurricane winds close around a small center; the Miami version Congress later printed said a "wide area near center." By Monday the Bureau was calling the hurricane-force area small. A storm like that can miss you by a little and leave you nothing worse than a loud night.

In 1935 there were no satellite pictures and no planes flying into hurricanes to measure them. There were forecasts, barometers, telephones, and whatever the last storm had taught you. A boat captain who lived on the Keys said in a [sworn statement](https://www.keyshistory.org/35-hurr-CaptEdButtersStatement.html) afterward that in his experience storms tended to show up later than forecast. Local knowledge can settle people down as easily as it can scare them.

Three men mattered most that weekend, and it helps to keep them straight.

- **Cutler** was on the islands and could watch the barometer, but he had no authority to order a train.
- **Ghent** had the authority, but he wasn't on the islands.
- **Sheldon** ran the camps and was expected to judge when to call for the train, and he was away until late Sunday afternoon.

People were worried anyway. Ghent was on the phone to the railroad before dawn. Out on the islands, Cutler talked with the supervisor of the bridge work, who was battening down for a hard blow, then called the railroad himself to suggest it get two trains ready to roll, while telling them he couldn't order them. He didn't reach Ghent until the middle of the afternoon. Ghent said Sheldon would be back shortly and would handle it. Sheldon got in late in the day and called the Weather Bureau in Miami. Cutler and Ghent agreed to watch and wait. At 10:30 that night, by the [timeline Congress later printed](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1936-pt8-v80/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1936-pt8-v80-4-2.pdf), the Miami forecaster told Sheldon it would be safe to stay until morning and promised to call if anything changed.

Each of them did something sensible with the piece he was holding. On a ship, the man who can order her turned around stands on the same deck as the barometer. On the Keys that weekend, the barometer was on one island and the authority to act on it was somewhere up the line.

Monday was Labor Day. Offices were closed and the yard men were off. Federal officials in Washington spent the morning trying to raise Florida's state relief office, and because of the holiday it took until about eleven to find the man in charge, in Tallahassee. He couldn't get Sheldon directly, so he sent word through the county relief administrator in Key West. The state administrator later testified that his message told them to bring the train down and "not wait"; the congressional timeline describes something looser, instructions to protect the men.

So Washington was calling Tallahassee to call Key West to call the camp.

At 12:43, the timeline says, the Miami Weather Bureau told Sheldon the camps weren't in immediate danger. At 1:20 the Weather Bureau issued a hurricane warning for the Key West district. At 1:37 Sheldon called Ghent. The barometer was dropping fast. Send the train.

## Six and a half hours to Islamorada

Ghent moved quickly. Within half an hour he had the railroad's managers on the line, and they promised a train out of Miami by four.

Then somebody had to build it. The passenger cars were scattered around the Miami yard. The mechanics were off for the holiday and the supervisors were hard to find. Summer service had been cut back, and for close to an hour there was no engine to shove the cars into place. The train pulled out at 4:25.

A drawbridge held it up outside Miami. There were the fifteen minutes at Homestead. Farther down, a cable had come down across the tracks, and clearing it took an hour or more, depending on whose account you read. None of this was unusual. These are the things that happen to trains, and any honest estimate has to leave room for them.

The train reached Islamorada, near the camps, somewhere between eight and 8:20. The storm hit around 8:25. In [one historian's account](https://myfloridahistory.org/taxonomy/term/346), the storm surge, the mound of seawater a hurricane shoves ahead of itself, overtook the train. Langlois thought his shack started floating around 7:45 or eight, and asked Congress not to hold him to the minute, which is a fair request from a man whose house had gone to sea.

From Sheldon's call at 1:37 to the arrival, the job took about six and a half hours. That's half what the railroad asked for in writing in June and nearly double the comforting number from Sunday. It's about how long a train takes on a holiday when everything goes the way things usually go.

{{component:evacuation-train-timeline.html}}

Ghent told Congress that "Dollars and cents were never considered, and are never considered when it comes to human life." Nothing in the record says otherwise; nobody has shown the train was held back to save the fare. What the arrangement asked of these officials was that they wait for a forecast clear enough to justify an evacuation, and then trust that an evacuation needing hours would fit into whatever hours were left.

The veterans weren't the only people on the Keys, and plenty of civilians died too; the House committee that investigated counted at least 105 identified dead with no tie to the camps and called that a minimum. What set the veterans apart was how they got there and how they were supposed to get out: hundreds of men put in one spot by their employer, with no way off except a train ordered by somebody else.

## The hearings over blame

A federal relief inquiry reported within the week, and later accounts describe it as calling the disaster an act of God. Ernest Hemingway, who lived in Key West and went up to see the wreckage, wrote in *New Masses* on September 17:

> "[Who sent them down](https://www.marxists.org/history/usa/pubs/masses-mainstream/1960/v13n01-jan-1960-mm.pdf) to the Florida Keys and left them there in hurricane months?"

A Veterans Administration investigator faulted the Florida relief officials for their evacuation planning and for being slow to call the train. The American Legion blamed the camp locations and the Weather Bureau's information, but declined to call Ghent and Sheldon criminally negligent.

Congress held hearings that spring. The House committee majority concluded that the surge was unexpected, that nobody could have foreseen it in time to guarantee the men's safety, and that the Weather Bureau had done what its equipment allowed. Three members dissented. There had been enough warning, they argued, there were other ways to move the men, and the government bore responsibility.

The majority had a point. Forecasting was crude, and the storm turned toward the islands late. But guaranteed safety is an easy standard to argue about after the fact, since nobody can guarantee anything about a hurricane. And nobody had to predict this particular hurricane to answer the railroad's letter. Its questions could have been settled at a desk in July. The plan actually in place worked only if the forecast came out right. It didn't, and there was no slack left to cover the miss.

The nearest thing to an answer to Hemingway's question came at those hearings, in Williams's reasons for choosing Florida: warm weather was cheaper, and nobody else wanted the men.

## Counting the dead

In the September heat, with bodies decomposing and caskets scarce, the governor ordered cremations on the advice of health officials. A federal court's later history says [at least 168 veterans' bodies](https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/BarefordRC_19-4633.pdf) were burned in the Keys alongside civilians, and the ashes couldn't afterward be told apart. Counts of the veterans who died run from about 250 to 262. The [National Hurricane Center](https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/outreach/history/) puts the storm's total at 408.

That left the Veterans Administration to work out who had died, often without a body to go on. The agency's chief worked from the August payroll. By May 1936 he had 121 men positively identified as dead, 45 tentatively identified, and 90 missing with no information at all. Part of the evidence for the tentative list was that seven men had left clothes at Miami laundries that nobody had picked up by September 28.

## Paid as relief workers

The committee majority found that very few of the dead men's families had any legal right to state or federal benefits. The men had worked on a project run by the state and paid for with federal money, which left them, legally speaking, belonging to nobody.

Congress patched that in a [law signed June 29, 1936](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-49/pdf/STATUTE-49-Pg2031-2.pdf). It gave the men of the three camps the workers' compensation that covered federal employees, on the reduced terms already used for an earlier batch of Depression relief workers. The three dissenters had wanted the families paid at the military's rates for death or disability in active service. They lost.

A widow with no children got 35 percent of her husband's monthly pay. A totally disabled man got two-thirds of his wage, capped at $25 a month and $3,500 altogether. The records don't settle whether room and board counted toward the wage. If only the thirty dollars cash counted, that widow got $10.50 a month.

The law also kept the usual one-year filing deadline, counted from the storm. Families had until September 2, a little over two months after the law existed. The agency running it, the U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, spread the word through veterans' groups and relief offices, took late claims, and asked Congress for more time.

Its [1938 report](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/SERIALSET-10400_00_00-007-0020-0000/pdf/SERIALSET-10400_00_00-007-0020-0000.pdf) gives the count as of that July. Families filed claims for 226 deaths. The commission approved 107, covering 196 dependents, and rejected 119. In 103 of the rejections, the family hadn't shown it depended on the dead man for support.

The rule had an ordinary purpose. Compensation replaces income a death takes away, so you have to show there was income coming your way. We don't know the story behind each rejected claim. But think about who these men were. They were in a relief camp because they couldn't support themselves. To collect, their families had to prove the men had been supporting somebody. A mother whose son had been broke for years could grieve him all she liked, and the law had nothing to say to her.

The injured are harder to read. Of the injury claims, 219 closed without a dime of disability pay; the report doesn't say how many of those men the doctors simply found fit. Ten collected for temporary disability, $2,836 among them, and six for permanent partial disability.

This past Wednesday was Veterans Day, and the country thanked its veterans for their service, as it does every year. In 1936 Congress had these men's service right in front of it, with nobody disputing it, and paid their families according to the job they held the day they drowned.

## The highway on the railroad bridges

The Florida Keys Memorial in Islamorada was [dedicated on November 14, 1937](https://npgallery.nps.gov/GetAsset/063ae076-8a97-4c92-b638-1510045afd80), eighty-nine years ago tomorrow. Its crypt holds the mingled ashes of veterans and civilians. A Miami American Legion post raised about $3,700 of the cost. Almost $9,000 came from the Works Progress Administration, the big federal jobs agency Williams was by then helping to run. As recently as 2022, a federal veterans court was still ruling on who could request a memorial marker for one of the men.

The railroad never rebuilt its line to Key West. The highway the veterans had been working on opened in 1938 along the abandoned rail route, on the old railroad bridges. It's still the one highway down the length of the islands, and for nearly everyone on them the only way out. These days Monroe County orders visitors out ahead of residents when a hurricane threatens, and Florida's planners keep a running figure for how many hours it would take to drive everybody off, a number that bears on how many new homes the islands get permits for. The railroad's questions are now worked out ahead of time, a few decades and a few hundred deaths after it asked them.

A county order covers residents and visitors. It has nothing to say about whether your boss has let you go yet.

The railroad's June questions still apply anywhere somebody else decides when you leave. How long does getting out actually take, on a holiday, with the usual delays? Who has the authority to start it, and are they anywhere near the weather? Where does everybody go, and is anyone expecting them? The camps added one the railroad never thought to ask: what does it cost you to leave before the order comes?

The men on Matecumbe already had the answer to that one. Stone had given it to them. If you go, you are through.

## Things to follow up on...

- **The investigators' own interviews:** The National Archives holds the hurricane investigation's interviews with veterans, camp supervisors, railroad men and Weather Bureau staff, described in its [collection guide](https://text-message.blogs.archives.gov/2011/09/02/the-labor-day-hurricane-of-1935/), and those volumes could settle who told whom what over that weekend.

- **The dissenters' case in full:** The [House minority views](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/SERIALSET-09994_00_00-122-2899-0001/pdf/SERIALSET-09994_00_00-122-2899-0001.pdf) signed by Edith Nourse Rogers, Harry Sauthoff and Charles Risk reproduce the railroad's June letter and the officials' testimony, and argue that the families deserved military rates.

- **Whether late claims got heard:** The compensation commission's [1938 annual report](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/SERIALSET-10400_00_00-007-0020-0000/pdf/SERIALSET-10400_00_00-007-0020-0000.pdf) names a proposed bill, H.R. 4098, to extend the filing deadline for families who missed it, and nobody has yet confirmed whether it passed.

- **Who may claim a marker:** The 2022 ruling in [*Bareford v. McDonough*](https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/BarefordRC_19-4633.pdf) shows the government still sorting out, nearly ninety years on, who has standing to request a memorial for a veteran whose ashes lie mixed with civilians' in Islamorada.

## More

- [Climate Past — Issue 58](<https://anchor.is/docket/issue/58/archive/markdown>)
- [Issue 58](<https://anchor.is/docket/issue/58/markdown>)
- [Publication guide](<https://anchor.is/docket/llms.txt>)