In San Diego County, a 1999 historical marker, put up by the county and a local history club, is titled "Hatfield—The Rainmaker." It gives the death toll from the January 1916 flood as 14. The U.S. Geological Survey, working from county coroners' reports at the time, recorded 22 deaths in San Diego County, most of them tied to the Otay flood. The two numbers don't cover the same ground, and neither comes with a list of names.
The marker remembers the more famous half of the story. Charles Hatfield is a great character: a man who said he could summon rain, got hired by a city, and never got paid. But the best-documented part of the story is the dam, whose failure an engineer described minute by minute. Whether Hatfield had anything to do with the storm can't be proved or disproved. To see how the two ended up sharing a plaque, it helps to go back to a deal that sounded unusually careful.
Paying only for success
In December 1915, Hatfield offered San Diego three ways to buy rain, as the historians Thomas Patterson and Richard Pourade reconstruct them. Two charged by the inch, but only for rain beyond a free first 30 or 40 inches, depending on the option. The third was to fill Morena Reservoir, part of the city's water supply, to overflowing by December 20, 1916, for $10,000. If he failed, the city would owe nothing.
Those free inches were Hatfield admitting, in his own pricing, that plenty of rain would fall without him. That's a rough version of what scientists call a baseline, an estimate of what would have happened anyway. The federal rainmakers in Texas a generation earlier had worked without one, and Congress, having paid for a test it could walk away from, came out with no answer. A threshold of 30 or 40 inches wouldn't prove anything about the rain above it, but it did at least acknowledge the problem.
On December 13, the council voted four to one to have the city attorney draw up a contract, and both historians say it picked the reservoir. That option dropped the baseline. It paid for an outcome, a full reservoir, no matter how the reservoir got full. Councilman Walter Moore reportedly put it this way: "It's heads the city wins, tails Hatfield loses."
I can see why that appealed. You could doubt Hatfield completely and still vote yes. If the reservoir stayed low, there was no fee. If ordinary weather filled it, $10,000 might seem a fair price for a full water supply.
And doubt was available. In 1905, the Vacaville Reporter, reprinting the Stockton Mail, noted that Hatfield had been paid $1,000 after 18 inches fell on Los Angeles, and asked who had made the rain that fell at the same time in places where he wasn't working. Pourade also describes recommendations that reached the council between 1912 and 1914 from a real estate agent, F. A. Binney, and the Wide Awake Improvement Club. Hatfield's December offer came with a photograph of a Stanislaus County lake he said he had filled. In a dry city, a real estate agent's living depends on promising water to the next buyer. For some of his backers, I suspect, a rainmaker was really a bet on growth, though the histories don't record their reasons.
Two dams, one storm
The written contract was never signed. Hatfield set up at Morena anyway. In mid-January 1916, rain fell across Southern California. The USGS investigation records 2.90 inches in San Diego over four days and 5.74 in Los Angeles over three, while one station in the San Bernardino Mountains got 27.80 inches in six. The periods don't line up, but the storm obviously reached well beyond one rainmaker's camp. The Stockton paper's question applied all over again.
On January 27, the Lower Otay Dam failed. This was a different dam from the one Hatfield had promised to fill: piled rock braced around a steel wall at its center. At about 4:45 in the afternoon, water started pouring over the top and carrying the rock away. At about 5:05, the steel wall burst. Messengers had been sent downstream to warn people, and the water swept through the Otay Valley, where families lived.
The council had treated a full reservoir as the goal. The families downstream of Lower Otay learned in those twenty minutes what a full reservoir could do once its dam gave way.
The price of collecting
Hatfield said he had delivered at Morena and wanted his $10,000. City attorney T. B. Cosgrove said nothing was owed: there was no signed contract, and the council resolution hadn't specified which offer it accepted. Some council members still wanted to pay. Hatfield sued on December 2, 1916.
By the time settlement talk came up, roughly six months later, claims against the city over the flood and over hiring a rainmaker reportedly totaled $3.5 million. That was money sought, not damages found, but it changed what paying him would mean. Pourade reports that the city offered to settle if Hatfield accepted responsibility for the lawsuits. Patterson describes a narrower version: the city's attorneys would recommend payment if he took responsibility for flood damage. Either way, to be paid for the rain, he would have had to own what the rain did.
He declined, and both sides were being consistent. Hatfield's fee depended on credit for the storm, and he couldn't afford credit for its consequences. Paying him would have handed the claimants a very useful fact: the city had hired the man who said he caused it.
Moore's coin had two faces, rain or no rain, and he treated both as safe. The deal protected the city against too little water. Too much water appeared in it only as a goal: "overflowing." Once that much water came, neither the city nor Hatfield wanted the word to mean what the deal said it meant.
Act of God
Pourade reports that two residents' damage suits, tried in 1919, ended in a verdict that the flood was an act of God, the legal term for a natural event no one can be held liable for. Other claims were settled. Hatfield's own suit, according to Patterson, was dismissed in 1938 because no one had pursued it. No court ever decided whether he made rain.
The city had tried to treat rain as something it could buy. When the rain turned deadly, it was protected by a jury's finding that nobody controls the weather.
Anyone who prices risk will recognize that trade. As long as weather is nobody's doing, losses fall where they land: on homeowners, on insurers, on whatever public relief exists. Once someone claims influence over the weather, there may be someone to sue. The Texas groundwater district that seeds clouds today pays for a season of flights out of its regular budget, which is one way to buy a modest effect without ever having to say which storm you caused.
What the Hatfield histories don't record is whether anyone weighing his offer, before January 1916, asked how much water Lower Otay could take. Those limits existed whatever made it rain. Cities still buy water supply, flood protection and cooling, and each purchase defines what success looks like. I'd want to know what your city's version says about getting more than it asked for, and whether anyone living below the dam was in the room when that got decided.

