
Bilateral Pressure

Two parallel enforcement actions in June made the supply chain environment around defense batteries and drones explicitly bilateral. DoD's June 8 expansion of the 1260H Chinese military companies list to 188 entities added three battery producers: BYD, CALB Group, and EVE Energy. Direct DoD contracting with all three is barred as of June 30. Indirect procurement of products containing their components is barred starting June 2027. Any defense-adjacent BOM with CALB or EVE cells now carries a compliance clock.
China's June 22 action was entity-specific and immediate. MOFCOM placed 10 U.S. firms on its export control list, barring transfer of China-origin dual-use items to them by any party worldwide. The targets include Red Cat Holdings and subsidiary Teal Drones, both BlueUAS-cleared drone platforms with active DoD and allied procurement. MP Materials, operator of the only active U.S. rare-earth mine, and USA Rare Earth, building domestic mine-to-magnet capacity, are also listed.
The MOFCOM restriction is not a commodity-class control. It does not modify China's suspended lithium battery export controls (Decision No. 70, expiring November 10). It targets named companies. But the extraterritorial scope covers any organization in any country transferring China-origin dual-use items to the 10 entities, which compresses sourcing options for firms already positioned as alternatives to Chinese supply. A separate Finance Ministry action on the same day excluded 46 U.S. defense firms from Chinese government procurement, including Shield AI, Anduril, and Edge Autonomy.
Two Section 842 Implementation Checkpoints Have Passed. The Public Record Shows Nothing.

The DFARS revision required by June 16 and the congressional compliance-repository briefing due May 1 produced no visible public artifacts. Eighteen months remain before the January 2028 new-acquisition prohibition takes effect. Zero domestic or allied-nation suppliers are in qualification against the 95% non-FEOC cost-origin test. No contracting officer has clause language to enforce it. The statute created the prohibition. The implementing rules that would tell manufacturers, primes, and program offices what compliance actually looks like have not appeared. The qualification clock cannot start until they do.

Two Section 842 Implementation Checkpoints Have Passed. The Public Record Shows Nothing.
The DFARS revision required by June 16 and the congressional compliance-repository briefing due May 1 produced no visible public artifacts. Eighteen months remain before the January 2028 new-acquisition prohibition takes effect. Zero domestic or allied-nation suppliers are in qualification against the 95% non-FEOC cost-origin test. No contracting officer has clause language to enforce it. The statute created the prohibition. The implementing rules that would tell manufacturers, primes, and program offices what compliance actually looks like have not appeared. The qualification clock cannot start until they do.
Blue UAS Certification Does Not Reach the Battery

The DCMA Blue UAS portal lists 67 cleared platforms and 197 Framework component records. Zero of those records cover batteries, cells, or energy storage in any form. That absence traces directly to §848 of the FY2020 NDAA, which scoped its China-origin prohibition around data-handling components and left batteries outside the compliance perimeter. A platform can carry Chinese-origin cells and remain Blue UAS-cleared, because the certification never asks the question. This piece maps the gap between what EO 14307 directed, what the portal actually exposes, and what to ask when someone cites platform clearance as battery compliance evidence.
Blue UAS Certification Does Not Reach the Battery
The DCMA Blue UAS portal lists 67 cleared platforms and 197 Framework component records. Zero of those records cover batteries, cells, or energy storage in any form. That absence traces directly to §848 of the FY2020 NDAA, which scoped its China-origin prohibition around data-handling components and left batteries outside the compliance perimeter. A platform can carry Chinese-origin cells and remain Blue UAS-cleared, because the certification never asks the question. This piece maps the gap between what EO 14307 directed, what the portal actually exposes, and what to ask when someone cites platform clearance as battery compliance evidence.

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